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process may be blocked from reading, writing, or executing up to a High-IL object MIC is thus based on the Biba Integrity Model for computer security (see http://en wikipediaorg/wiki/Biba_model): no write up, no read down designed to protect integrity This contrasts with the model proposed by Bell and LaPadula for the US Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy (see http://enwikipedia org/wiki/Bell-LaPadula_model): no write down, no read up, designed to protect confidentiality MIC isn t directly visible, but rather it serves as the underpinning of some of the key new security features in Vista and later: User Account Control (UAC), and Low Rights Internet Explorer (LoRIE) We ll talk briefly about them to show how MIC works in practice UAC (it was named Least User Access, or LUA, in prerelease versions of Vista) is perhaps the most visible new security feature in Vista It works as follows: 1 Developers mark applications by embedding an application manifest (available since XP) to tell the operating system whether the application needs elevated privileges 2 The LSA has been modi ed to grant two tokens at logon to administrative accounts: a ltered token and a linked token The ltered token has all elevated privileges stripped out (using the restricted token mechanism described at msdnmicrosoftcom/en-us/library/aa379316(VS85)aspx) 3 Applications are run by default using the ltered token; the full-privilege linked token is used only when launching applications that are marked as requiring elevated privileges 4 The user is prompted using a special consent environment (the rest of the session is grayed out and inaccessible) whether they in fact want to launch the program and may be prompted for appropriate credentials if they are not members of an administrative group Assuming application developers are well behaved, Vista thus achieves mandatory access control of a sort: only specific applications can be launched with elevated privileges Here s how UAC uses MIC: All nonadministrative user processes run with MediumIL by default Once a process has been elevated using UAC, it runs with High-IL and can thus access objects at that level Thus, it s now mandatory to have High-IL privileges to access certain objects within Windows MIC also underlies the LoRIE implementation in Vista: the Internet Explorer process (iexploreexe) runs at Low-IL and, in a system with default configuration, can write only to objects that are labeled with Low-IL SIDs (by default, this includes only the folder %USERPROFILE%\AppData\LocalLow and the Registry key HKCU\Software\ AppDataLow) LoRIE thus cannot write to any other object in the system by default, greatly restricting the damage that can be done if the process gets compromised by malware while browsing the Internet.

save it in a suitable location (for example, a Forms folder on the network) without opening the underlying template

4:

document from a template, this problem doesn t arise However, you can also use a document, provided that you protect it with a modify password (see 18) to force each user to open a copy of the document rather than the document itself If you plan to have users open the form from Word s Open dialog box, a document is preferable, because it appears in the Open dialog box when one of the Word Document filters is applied (for example, All Word Documents, Word Documents, or Word Macro-Enabled Documents), whereas a template does not (The user must choose a filter such as All Word Templates or All Files to display templates in the Open dialog box)

In the Vista release, provisions are in place to allow unmarked code to run with administrative privileges In future releases, the only way to run an application elevated will be to have a signed manifest that identifies the privilege level the application needs UAC can be disabled system-wide under the User Accounts Control Panel, Turn User Account Control Off setting Security researcher Joanna Rutkowska wrote some interesting criticisms of UAC and MIC in Vista at http://theinvisiblethingsblogspotcom/2007/02/running-vista-everydayhtml Windows technology guru Jesper Johansson has written some insightful articles on UAC in his blog at http://msinfluentialscom/blogs/jesper/

With your plan in place, start the form document or template Follow these steps: 1 Create a new template or document as usual For example:

Data Execution Prevention (DEP)

For many years, security researchers have discussed the idea of marking portions of memory nonexecutable The major goal of this feature was to prevent attacks against the Achilles heel of software, the buffer overflow Buffer overflows (and related memory corruption vulnerabilities) typically rely on injecting malicious code into executable portions of memory, usually the CPU execution stack or the heap Making the stack nonexecutable, for example, shuts down one of the most reliable mechanisms for exploiting software available today: the stack-based buffer overflow (See 10 for more details on buffer-overflows vulnerabilities and related exploits) Microsoft has moved closer to this holy grail by implementing what they call Data Execution Prevention, or DEP (see supportmicrosoftcom/kb/875352 for full details) DEP has both hardware and software components When run on compatible hardware, DEP kicks in automatically and marks certain portions of memory as nonexecutable unless it explicitly contains executable code Ostensibly, this would prevent most stackbased buffer overflow attacks In addition to hardware-enforced DEP, XP SP2 and later also implement software-enforced DEP that attempts to block exploitation of Structured Exception Handling (SEH) mechanisms in Windows, which have historically provided attackers with a reliable injection point for shellcode (for example, see wwwsecuriteam com/windowsntfocus/5DP0M2KAKAhtml) Software-enforced DEP is more effective with applications that are built with the SafeSEH C/C++ linker option

Select the template on which you want to base the new template or document In the Create New area, select the Template option button if you want to create

As we ve seen throughout this chapter, hijacking or compromising highly-privileged Windows services is a common attack technique Ongoing awareness of this has prompted Microsoft to continue to harden the services infrastructure in Windows XP

New dialog box Word creates the template or document 2 Save the template or document For example, click the Save button on the Quick Access Toolbar, and then use the Save As dialog box to save the le 3 Add information about the form to the template s or document s properties For example:

and Server 2003, and with Vista and Server 2008 they have taken service level security even further with Windows Service Hardening, which includes the following: Service Resource Isolation Least Privilege Services Session 0 Isolation Restricted Network Accessibility

4 Enter the text and create the layout of the form For example: